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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since 1990 Japan has experienced over a decade of slow growth in real economic
activity. Between 1990 and 2000 per capita output grew at an annual rate
of 0.68 percent, per capita investment declined at the rate of 1.4 percent per
annum and weekly hours per adult worker declined by 1.18 percent per annum.
This period has come to be referred to as ”the lost decade.” During the same
period the inﬂation rate, as measured by the growth rate of the GDP deﬂator,
fell from 2.3 percent to -1.8 percent and the nominal interest rate fell from 7.4
percent to 0.1 percent. Japan’s recent experience of slow growth accompanied
by deﬂation and zero nominal interest rates raises questions about the role of
monetary policy in times of deﬂation. Should monetary policy take actions to
avoid the zero nominal interest rate bound and if so, what policies can avoid it
and/or ameliorate its negative eﬀects?
This paper develops a model that accounts for the real and nominal facts
from the 1990s and uses this model to answer the two questions posed above.
We consider a costly price adjustment model along the lines of Rotemberg
(1996) and extend it to allow for capital accumulation. In this economy monop-
olistically competitive ﬁrms face convex costs of adjusting prices. Households
own the capital stock and are subject to convex costs of adjustment. The econ-
omy experiences exogenous shocks to technology and government purchases and
the monetary authority follows an interest rate targeting rule that assigns weight
to current output deviations from trend and current deviations of inﬂation from
its target level.
Solving for the equilibrium is complicated by the possibility of a zero nom-
inal interest rate constraint. We develop an algorithm for computing perfect
2foresight equilibria in situations where the nominal interest rate is zero over
some interval of time. The model is then solved and simulated using a parame-
terization that is calibrated to Japanese data.
An impulse response analysis is used to answer the ﬁrst question. We ﬁnd
that the dynamic response of the economy to shocks in technology and govern-
ment purchases is very diﬀerent depending on whether the zero nominal interest
rate constraint binds. When the constraint is not binding output and invest-
ment increase in response to improvements in technology under the interest rate
targeting rule we consider. However, when the constraint binds, monetary pol-
icy cannot respond and output and investment all fall in response to positive
technology shocks. A binding constraint also exacerbates the contractionary
eﬀects of negative government purchase shocks on these same variables.
To answer the second question we need a baseline speciﬁcation that repro-
duces the nominal and real facts from Japan’s lost decade. This is found by
simulating the model under the assumption of perfect foresight using the ac-
tual realizations of TFP and government purchases from Japanese data. The
long-run output share of government purchases and the level of the long-run
nominal interest rate are then adjusted to produce a speciﬁcation that accounts
for the facts from the 1990s. A very low level of of the long-run nominal interest
rate target (about 0.3 percent) and a high long run value of output share of
government purchases (about 0.2) are needed to account for the nominal facts.
Having found a speciﬁcation that reproduces Japan’s experience in the 1990s
we turn to consider whether alternative monetary policy rules could have avoided
the zero nominal interest rate bound and/or ameliorated its eﬀects. We vary
three aspects of monetary policy - the magnitude of the output and inﬂation
3reaction coeﬃcients in the Taylor rule, the setting of the long-run nominal in-
terest rate and the duration of the time interval that the nominal interest rate
is zero. Varying the reaction coeﬃcients produces monetary policies that diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in terms of their implications for e.g. the growth rate of output
during the 1990s and welfare, but not in terms of their implications for the zero
nominal interest rate bound. In all cases, the nominal interest rate falls to zero.
A carry tax on money as proposed by Goodfriend (2000) allows the eﬀective
nominal interest rate to be negative and thereby relaxes the zero nominal interest
rate constraint. Our simulations indicate that this is a good policy that increases
output growth by 0.6 percent per annum in the last half of the 1990s and
improves welfare by about 0.07 percent relative to the baseline speciﬁcation.
Another monetary policy that achieves welfare gains of a similar magnitude
is a commitment to set the long-run nominal interest rate at a level that is
consistent with price stability. This policy avoids the bound for plausible values
of the shock processes and is easier to administer than a tax on money. We argue
that this policy is also likely to be a good policy in a stochastic environment.
Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2003) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
have found that optimal monetary policy calls for keeping the nominal interest
rate at zero for a number of periods after the constraint ceases to bind. We refer
to this characteristic of monetary policy as policy duration. In our model policy
duration also ameliorates the negative eﬀects of a binding zero nominal interest
rate constraint and produces welfare gains that increase with the number of
periods that the interest rate is kept at zero.
Our work is related to previous work by Orphanides and Wieland (2000),
Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2003) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
4Our work extends this previous research in four respects. First, our economy has
endogenous capital formation. This generalization allows for aggregate saving,
which fundamentally alters the response of households to shocks and also allows
us to link our model’s implications to data on the Japanese national income and
product accounts. Second, we formally calibrate our model to Japanese data and
empirically assess the quality of our model’s ﬁt to Japanese data from the 1990s.
Third, the time zero shock that produces a binding zero nominal interest rate
constraint in our model is empirically relevant. For the 1990s we assume that
TFP and government purchases follow the same trajectories that the Japanese
economy experienced. In these other papers the time zero shocks considered are
arbitrary. Fourth, the previous literature considers optimal policy under the
assumption that a long-run objective of the central bank is price stability. We
fail to ﬁnd a Taylor rule that is both consistent with the facts from Japan in
the 1990s and a long-run inﬂation target of zero.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2
describes the model. Section 3 describes how the model is calibrated, solved
and simulated. Section 4 reports the results and we conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 Household Problem




t=0 βt{logct + Υ(Mt+1/Pt)+ν log(1 − ht)}, (1)
5where ct is consumption of the composite good, Mt+1 is per capita holdings of
money at the end of the period t,a n dht is hours worked expressed as a fraction
of a time endowment of one. We assume satiation of utility from real balances,
i.e. there exists m such that Υ0(m) > 0 for all m<m and Υ0(m) = 0 for all
m ≥ m.1
The household’s period t budget constraint is
ct + xt + Mt+1/Pt + Bt+1/Pt
= Mt/Pt +( 1+Rt−1)Bt/Pt +
R 1
0 (Ξt(i)/Pt)di
+ Tt +( 1− τ)rtkt + wtht + τδkt, (2)
where Pt is the price level, Bt+1 is the household’s holdings of nominal debt
at the end of the period t, kt is capital and xt is investment. Households hold
equal amounts of shares in each intermediate goods ﬁrm so that Ξt(i)i sp e r
capita nominal proﬁts from intermediate ﬁrm index i. Finally, households pay
a proportional tax τ on capital income and receive lump-sum transfers of size
Tt from the government.






The function Φ is assumed to have the following properties: Φ(eµ)=eµ−1+δ,
Φ0(eµ)=1a n dΦ00(eµ)=φ (> 0) where eµ is the steady-state growth rate of
1If Υ0(m) > 0 for all m, then the zero interest rate bound never binds. Since we want to
analyze monetary policy under a binding zero nominal interest rate constraint, this assumption
is needed.
6TFP.2 The ﬁrst property implies that adjustment costs in the steady-state are
zero, i.e. the capital accumulation equation becomes linear in the steady-state.
This form of adjustment costs is the same as speciﬁcations previously considered
by Woodford (2003) and Christiano (2004).
2.2 Final Good Firm Problem
The ﬁnal goods sector is perfectly competitive. Firms combine intermediate
goods to produce output which can either be consumed or used for investment.









Proﬁt maximization yields the following input demand functions for intermedi-
ate ﬁrms
yt(i)d =( pt(i)/Pt)−θyt (5)
where pt(i) is the price of good i.
2.3 The Intermediate Goods Firm Problem





2We log-linearize the model when solving it and these assumptions are the only restrictions
on adjustment costs needed to perform the log-linearization.
7where A is a shock to the technology for goods production. Each ﬁrm faces a
demand function for its good given by (5) and maximizes the discounted sum of
future proﬁts. It is convenient to solve the intermediate goods ﬁrm’s problem
in two steps. Cost minimization yields the following relations governing input










t /{αα(1 − α)1−αA
1−α
t }. (9)

















subject to the demand function given by (5) where Π denotes the steady-state
gross inﬂation rate, which is deﬁned as the gross growth rate of the overall
price level, Πt(i) denotes pt(i)/pt−1(i), the gross growth rate of the price of
intermediate good i,a n dt h ef u n c t i o nΓ represents convex costs of price adjust-
ment. Price adjustment costs for ﬁrm i are proportionate to ﬁnal goods output
and depend on the current gross growth rate of the ﬁrm’s prices relative to the
steady-state gross growth rate of the overall price level. This speciﬁcation of
price adjustment costs is also used in e.g. Ireland (2004). We will assume that
8Γ satisﬁes Γ(1) = 0, Γ0(1) = 0, and Γ00(1) = γ>0. These assumptions are suﬃ-
cient to log-linearize the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem given
by (11). The resulting log-linearized representation is the same as log-linearized
representations for speciﬁcations where the costs are proportional to a ﬁrm’s
gross proﬁts and speciﬁcations where ﬁrms are subject to Calvo price-setting
rules instead of convex adjustment costs.3
2.4 Government and feasibility
The government budget constraint is:
Tt + gt = τ(rt − δ)kt +( Mt+1 − Mt)/Pt + {Bt+1 − (1 + Rt−1)Bt}/Pt (12)
where gt denotes government purchases in period t. Since our economy has
lump-sum taxation, Ricardian equivalence applies and the time paths of gov-
ernment bonds and lump-sum taxation don’t aﬀect prices or allocations.
From the previous deﬁnitions it follows that the aggregate resource con-
straint is:








We consider interest rate targeting rules (see e.g. Taylor(1993)) of the following
form:
Rt =m a x [ R(yt,π t),0], (14)
3This point is discussed in more detail Braun and Waki (2005).
9where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 − 1 is the net inﬂation rate and the function R represents
a feedback mechanism. When the economy is log-linearized the Taylor rule
becomes:
ˆ Rt ≡ Rt − R =m a x [ R + ρyˆ yt + ρπˆ πt,0] − R
=m a x [ ρyˆ yt + ρπˆ πt,−R] (15)
where ˆ yt denotes a percentage deviation of detrended yt from its steady-state
value, ˆ πt a deviation of πt from its steady-state value and R is the steady-state
value of R(yt,π t).4 We refer to R as the long-run nominal interest rate.
2.6 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition (Symmetric Monopolistically Competitive Equilibrium) Given
( P−1, R−1, k0, M0, B0, {gt,A t}∞
t=0 ) and a monetary policy Rt =m a x [ R(yt,π t),0],
a monopolistically competitive symmetric equilibrium is a factor price sequence
{rt,w t,χ t}∞
t=0,aﬁnal good price sequence {Pt}∞
t=0, a nominal interest rate se-
quence {Rt}∞
t=0, an allocation {ct,k t+1,h t,M t+1}∞
t=0 and a ﬁnite set of integers
IB which satisﬁes the following conditions;
• Given all prices, households maximize their utility.
• Given factor prices, the price of the ﬁnal good and (5), proﬁts are maxi-
mized for each intermediate good ﬁrm at (kt(i),h t(i),p t(i)) = (kt,h t,P t)
for all t and i.
• Monetary policy
— The zero interest rate constraint binds for all t ∈ IB and Rt = R(yt,π t)
for other t ≥ 0.
— When Rt > 0, the monetary authority supplies Mt+1 which satisﬁes
households’ demand for money. Otherwise, the monetary authority
supplies Mt+1 which is the minimal amount of money that satisﬁes
households’ demand for money.
• The government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
• Markets clear.
This completes the description of the model.
4We detrend variables by scaling them by the level of TFP, which is assumed to grow at
an exponential rate. More details on how the variables are detrended can be found in Braun
and Waki (2005).
103 Calibration and Simulation
3.1 Simulation Method
Computing the equilibrium consists of the following two steps: (1) First we log-
linearize the equilibrium conditions about a balanced growth path and (2) we
solve the resulting log-linearized system. This section provides an overview of
the solution method. (Complete details of the steps involved in linearizing and
solving the model can be found in the Appendix to Braun and Waki (2005).)
The presence of the zero nominal interest rate bound on monetary policy
creates two diﬃculties. First it complicates the solution of the model since the
policy function is not well approximated by a linear function. The second diﬃ-
culty is that the zero nominal interest rate bound alters the stability properties
of the model as pointed out by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001).
They ﬁnd that there are two steady-states; one where the nominal interest rate
is zero and one with a positive nominal interest rate. There are inﬁnitely many
equilibria that converge to the former steady-state and a unique convergent path
to the latter one.
We confront these two issues by approximating the Taylor rule (14) with
the piece-wise linear function (15) and focusing on a particular class of equilib-
ria. Attention is restricted to equilibria in which the zero nominal interest rate
constraint binds once for a ﬁnite number of periods. Other equilibria in which
the zero constraint might bind for a while, cease to bind and then start to bind
again are ruled out. These assumptions imply that there exists some period T
such that the nominal interest rate is zero in period T −1a n df o ra l lt ≥ T the
nominal interest rate is strictly positive. Similarly, there is a period S such that
11the nominal interest rate is positive in period S −1 and zero in period S.T h e n
the nominal interest is zero from S to T − 1. As of period T, any equilibrium
in this class has the property that under standard regularity conditions there
is a unique convergent path to a steady-state with a positive nominal interest
rate. Consider next the remaining two subintervals, S ≤ t<Tand 0 ≤ t<S .
Since each of these two intervals has a ﬁnite number of periods, there is a unique
equilibrium sequence for given S and T.
For given S and T the equilibrium is computed in the following way. Given
a level of the capital stock in period T, kT, calculate the equilibrium path for
all t ≥ T. Next use the equilibrium values of the variables in period T to solve
the system backward for k0. Repeat for diﬀerent choices of kT until the implied
initial capital stock k0 is equal to its value in Japanese data.
The conditions described so far produce a unique equilibrium for given
choices of S and T. However, once these two parameters are allowed to vary
multiple equilibria can and do arise in calibrated versions of our model. Multi-
ple combinations of S and T produce bona ﬁde equilibria. Imposing the further
restrictions that S occurs in 1997 and then choosing T to be the earliest year
where the constraint ceases to bind is suﬃcient to rule out all equilibria but
one.
3.2 Calibration
Table 1 reports the parameterization of the model. Most of the parameters of
our model are calibrated along the lines of Hayashi and Prescott (2002). This
includes the capital share parameter, α, the rate of depreciation on capital, δ,
12the preference discount rate, β, and the tax rate on capital income, τ.5
The elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods in ﬁnal goods produc-
tion is chosen to produce a markup of 15 percent. We set the leisure weight
parameter, ν, so that steady-state hours in the model is 31.6 hours per week.
This number is calibrated in the following way. Multiply the average work-week
for workers in each year from 1990 to 2000 times employment in the same year.
Then divide the resulting values by the working age population in each year and
ﬁnally compute the sample average.
We set the baseline Taylor rule reaction coeﬃcients to 0.4 for output and
1.7 for inﬂation. These values are found to be optimal by Fujiwara et al. (2004)
using the Bank of Japan’s Japanese Economic Model when the weight on the
output gap in the monetary authority’s loss function is 0.08. This choice of
reaction coeﬃcients may or may not be optimal in the present model. The
calibration of the long-run nominal interest rate is described below in Section 4.2
and Section 4.3 conducts a sensitivity analysis of this aspect of the calibration.
We choose the adjustment cost parameter on prices, γ,s ot h a tt h em o d e l
reproduces the level of the inﬂation rate in 1990. The resulting value for γ is
101.4. The adjustment cost parameter on capital, φ, was set to two. Our choice
is somewhat lower than the value assumed by Christiano (2004) who sets the
same parameter to three.
In order to conduct simulations, we still need to specify the value of the
initial capital stock and the entire path of exogenous variables (technology and
government purchases). A description of how this is done is deferred to Section
4.2.
5Interested readers are referred to Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for more details.
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4.1 Impulse response analysis
Before reporting simulation results it is useful to ﬁrst describe the dynamic re-
sponses of our model economy to shocks in government purchases and technol-
ogy. The principal objective for conducting this analysis is to ascertain whether
a binding zero nominal interest rate constraint matters and if so how it mat-
ters. A binding zero nominal interest rate constraint gives rise to a liquidity
trap with falling output and prices in models without endogenous investment
such as those considered by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) and Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003). Christiano (2004), however, ﬁnds that this property relies on
the assumption that investment is exogenous. Since investment is endogenous
in our model it is important to understand how a binding zero nominal interest
rate constraint aﬀects the dynamics of the model. Impulse response functions
also provide a way to assess the calibration of the model parameters. Assessing
the calibration is particularly important in costly price adjustment models with
capital formation. Basu and Kimball (2003), for instance, ﬁnd that the response
of output to a positive shock in government purchases is negative in a similar
model to ours when there are no adjustment costs on capital or investment.
In costly price adjustment models the dynamic responses of the economy
to shocks in technology and government purchases can also vary considerably
depending on the details of the monetary policy rule. Braun and Waki (2005)
provide a detailed analysis of these characteristics of the model. Here we limit
attention to the baseline speciﬁcation described above in Section 3.1.
Figure 1 reports model impulse response functions to AR 1 shocks in tech-
14nology and government purchases under the baseline Taylor rule assuming a
long-run nominal interest rate target of 0.1 percent, a steady-state growth rate
of technology of 2 percent per annum and a steady-state government share of
output of 0.20.6 For a government purchases shock we simulate (A23) setting the
ˆ A’s to zero and use the following sequence (ˆ g0, ˆ g1,ˆ g2,...)=( −0.1,−0.08,−0.064,...).
This choice corresponds to an AR 1 rule with an autoregressive coeﬃcient of
0.8. A shock to technology is simulated in an analogous way. Each plot contains
two lines. The dashed line reports results for the case where the zero nominal
interest rate constraint is ignored and the solid line shows the responses when
the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is modeled.
Consider ﬁrst the results for government purchases that abstract from the
zero bound constraint reported in Panel A. Lower government purchases lower
output and crowd in private consumption and investment. The intuition for
these responses is as follows. Lower government purchases mean lower (lump-
sum) taxes and consumption rises on impact as emphasized in the analyses of
Hall (1980) and Barro (1981). In subsequent periods consumption monotoni-
cally declines back towards its steady-state level. From the household ﬁrst order
condition (A1) this implies a lower real interest rate. Lower government pur-
chases also lower the markup which from (A6) and (A7) acts to increase ﬁrm
demand for labor and capital. However, these markup eﬀects are small relative
to the intertemporal substitution eﬀects associated with a lower real interest
rate and hours fall and investment increases.
Imposing the zero nominal interest rate constraint has negative eﬀects on the
6The value of the long-run nominal interest rate used here is speciﬁcally scaled to insure
that the zero constraint binds for 10 percent impulses to either exogenous variable. In Section
4.2 we will ﬁnd that a somewhat higher setting of this parameter can reproduce the facts from
the 1990s.
15responses of most variables. Output and hours fall by nearly twice as much and
the positive responses of investment and consumption are now much smaller.
In our model the binding zero nominal interest constraint is limiting the ability
of the monetary authority to counteract the negative eﬀects of a decline in
government purchases.
Consider next an improvement in technology as reported in Panel B of Fig-
ure 1. For the case where the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is ignored,
the impulse responses broadly resemble those that would arise in a real business
cycle model. Output, consumption and investment all increase. Altig et al.
(2002) and Kahn et al. (2002) have previously found that an optimal mone-
tary policy in sticky price models will seek to undo the constraints that costly
price adjustment imposes on allocations. To the extent that monetary policy is
successful in undoing these constraints, the resulting dynamic responses will re-
produce the dynamic real responses that would arise in a real economy without
price distortions. This eﬀect of monetary policy is operating here but it is not
completely successful as can be seen by the responses of the markup and hours.7
The higher markup lowers the wage rate and this in turn induces a decline in
hours. 8
The solid lines in Panel B of Figure 1 report impulse responses to a 10 percent
improvement in technology for the case where a zero nominal interest rate bound
is imposed. These results are also consistent with the widely held view that the
zero nominal interest rate bound ties the hands of the monetary authority. The
7Under alternative monetary policies the responses can be very diﬀerent from the responses
reported in Panel B of Figure 1. If, for instance, monetary policy is assumed to follow an
exogenous k percent rule instead, output and investment both fall on impact (see Braun and
Waki (2005) for details).
8Gali and Rabanal (2004) argue that a decline in hours in response to an improvement
in technology is a robust property of costly price adjustment models and provide empirical
evidence that hours decline in response to improvements in technology using U.S. data.
16zero nominal interest rate bound hampers the ability of the monetary authority
to ease interest rates and output, investment and consumption now fall. The
eﬀects of the zero bound are also quite large. Output falls by over 9 percent
now as compared to a 3 percent increase when the zero bound constraint is
not imposed. The reason for this response is the large increase in the markup,
which is acting like a tax on investment and labor input. With a higher markup
i n v e s t m e n tn o wf a l l sb y2 9p e r c e n ta sc o m p a r e dt oa4p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ew h e n
the constraint is not imposed and hours now decline by 25 percent as compared
to 5 percent before.
To summarize, our results indicate that the dynamic response of the economy
to either shock is quite diﬀerent when the zero nominal interest rate bound is
modeled and a shock arrives that leads the constraint to bind. In this sense,
a binding zero nominal interest rate constraint ties the hands of the monetary
authority. The eﬀects of this constraint are most pronounced for technology
shocks but a binding zero constraint also ampliﬁes the responses of output and
hours to negative government purchases shocks. We now turn to investigate the
quantitative performance of our model during the 1990s in Japan.
4.2 Accounting for the facts from the lost decade
Our objective is to provide a quantitative assessment of alternative monetary
policies during the lost decade. In order to do this we need a baseline speciﬁca-
tion that can account for the main facts from this period. In our view the most
important real facts are that per capita output grew at 0.68 percent per annum,
per capita investment fell at 1.4 percent per annum and hours worked declined
by 1.18 percent per annum. The key nominal facts from the 1990s are that
17the nominal interest rate fell from 7.4 percent to 0.1 percent and the inﬂation
rate, as measured by the growth rate of the GDP deﬂator, fell from 2.3 to -1.8
percent.
Our model has two exogenous sources of variation: government purchases
and technology. Since the model assumes perfect foresight there is only one
surprise to households and it occurs in 1990 when households see two inﬁnite
sequences of TFP and government purchases realizations. To compute a solution
we need to specify the entire sequence ( 0,  1,  2,...) in equation (A23) and the
initial condition ˆ k0. This is done in the following way. The initial capital stock
is set to match its 1990 value in Japanese data.9 For the 1990s we condition
on the actual time path of TFP and government purchases. For the period
beyond 2000 we ﬁrst assumed that TFP growth was 0.3 percent per annum,
and that the share of government purchases in output was 15 percent in each
period. These are the same assumptions made by Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Monetary policy follows the baseline Taylor rule with an output coeﬃcient of
0.4 and inﬂation coeﬃcient of 1.7 and set the long-run nominal interest rate
w a si n i t i a l l ys e tt o2 . 3p e r c e n ts ot h a ti ti m p l i e daz e r ol o n g - r u ni n ﬂation rate.
However, these conditioning assumptions did not reproduce the real and nominal
facts for the 1990s. In particular, the nominal interest rate did not fall to zero.
We then experimented with a variety of other conditioning assumptions. We
found that if the long-run government share of output is set to 20 percent and
the long-run nominal interest rate is set to 0.3 percent then the model does a
reasonable job of explaining the real and nominal facts from the lost decade.10
9We use Hayashi and Prescott’s (2002) measure of the capital stock. The presence of
adjustment costs on capital in our model means that their measure of the capital stock should
be adjusted to account for these costs. However, we have made no such adjustment.
10We also assume a 15 year transition from the year 2000 for TFP and government purchases
18More generally, our experiments suggest that it is diﬃcult to produce a binding
zero nominal interest rate and the other facts from the 1990s with higher long-
run nominal interest rate targets and lower long-run government purchase shares
of output.
To understand why these particular conditioning assumptions work it is
helpful to refer back to the impulse response analysis in Section 4.1. Note that
a positive impulse to TFP and/or a negative impulse to government purchases is
needed to produce a decline in the nominal interest rate and inﬂation. Low TFP
growth in the long-run means that TFP in the 1990s is seen to be temporarily
high by households. As a result, both the nominal interest rate and inﬂation rate
fall.11 Higher government purchases in the long-run also act to drive down the
nominal interest rate and inﬂation rate in the 1990s, since households perceive
government purchases in 1990s to be temporarily low.
Figure 2 reports model simulations and Japanese data for our baseline speci-
ﬁcation. From this ﬁgure one can see that the model does a surprisingly good job
of accounting for both the real and nominal facts from Japan in the 1990s. The
patterns in output, inﬂation, investment and the nominal interest rate ﬁtt h e
data well. The model’s success in reproducing the pattern in hours is partially
due to our assumption about ν, the preference parameter weight on leisure. As
n o t e da b o v ei nS e c t i o n3 . 1 ,ν is calibrated so that the steady-state value of hours
is 31.6 hours per week. The biggest gap between our theory and Japanese data
is the 1990 value of the nominal interest rate. The model predicts a nominal
interest rate of 5 percent whereas the value in the data is 7.4 percent. We are
to adjust to their new steady-state values.
11The initial capital output ratio also matters. We are implicitly assuming that the initial
capital output ratio is low relative to its ultimate steadystate value. This turns out to be the
case when we simulate the model using Japanese data.
19not particularly concerned by this gap between our theory and the data since
at this time interest rates were set at a high level by the monetary authority in
an eﬀort to slow the asset price bubble. The Taylor rule we are using does not
incorporate this aspect of monetary policy. The model also slightly understates
investment in 1990 and the capital output ratio in 2000. Based on these results
we conclude that our model successfully accounts for the main real and nominal
facts from Japan’s lost decade.
4.3 Monetary policy during the lost decade
During this period monetary policy has come under considerable criticism. It
has been argued that an alternative monetary policy might have stimulated
economic activity during the 1990’s and/or avoided the zero nominal interest
rate bound. For example, Jinushi et al. (2000) and McCallum (2003) suggest
that monetary policy was tight during the 1990s and Krugman (1998), Bernanke
(2000), Svensson (2001) and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) have all proposed
alternative policies that in their views would produce better outcomes. (See Ito
and Mishkin (2004) for an excellent review of the large literature on this topic).
We next use our model as a laboratory to investigate how alternative mon-
etary policies aﬀect economic outcomes during the 1990s. We consider three
general types of variations in the monetary policy rule: the magnitude of the
reaction coeﬃcients on output and inﬂation, the value of the long-run nominal
interest rate and the length of the interval over which the interest rate is kept
at zero.
Variations in the Taylor rule reaction coeﬃcients
Table 2 reports simulation results for four settings of the Taylor rule reaction
20coeﬃcients on output and inﬂation. In this table the baseline speciﬁcation is re-
ferred to as Taylor rule 3. Fujiwara et al. (2004) ﬁnd that Taylor rules 2 though
4 are all optimal rules for particular settings of the weight on the output gap
in a quadratic loss function in the output gap and inﬂation gap for the central
bank. Taylor rule 1 is reported for completeness. It provides information on
the properties of a Taylor rule that assigns most weight to the output gap. All
of the results in Table 2 condition on a long-run nominal interest rate of 0.3
percent. A comparison of these four rules indicates that none of them avoid the
zero nominal interest rate bound. This result is quite striking since these rules
span a set of orthodox policies that range from output stabilization targeting
(Taylor rule 1) to a pure inﬂation stabilization target (Taylor rule 4). However,
the four monetary policies do diﬀer in other respects. Output contracts during
the 1990s under Taylor rule 1, whereas Taylor rule 4 shows the strongest out-
put growth during the 1990s and also the most deﬂation in 2000. Taylor rule
4a l s ol o o k sa t t r a c t i v ei no t h e rr e s p e c t s. It turns in the highest consumption
and investment growth during the 1990s. Another distinction is in the length of
the interval of time when the nominal interest rate is zero. Under Taylor Rule
1 the nominal interest rate is zero for 27 years while under Taylor rule 4 the
constraint ceases to bind in 2009.
Given these diﬀerences among the four policies it is interesting to evaluate
them on the basis of economic welfare. The last row of Table 2 reports welfare
for each policy. Welfare is reported from the perspective of Taylor rule 3. We
follow the methodology of Lucas (2003) and calculate the constant supplement
to each period’s consumption under Taylor rule 3 that renders present value
utility under Taylor rule 3 equal to present value utility under each other Taylor
21rule.12 Thus a value of 0.19 for Taylor Rule 1 implies that the welfare gain of
m o v i n gf r o mT a y l o rr u l e3t oT a y l o rr u l e1i se q u i v a l e n tt oac o n s t a n t0 . 2 0
percent of consumption.
A striking property of these welfare calculations is that Taylor rule 1 pro-
duces the highest welfare. To understand this result note that Taylor rule 1
has a zero nominal interest rate for the longest interval of time. Next note that
whenever we change the long run interest rate target R the long-run inﬂation
target π also changes one for one. Adjustment costs are relative to this long-run
inﬂation target. Thus, when the long-run nominal interest rate target is 0.3
percent the Friedman rule is, to a ﬁrst approximation, the optimal monetary
policy in this economy. As pointed out in Aiyagari and Braun (1998) there are
two factors that determine optimal monetary policy in this economy: the inﬂa-
tion tax eﬀects emphasized by Friedman(1966) and Cooley and Hansen (1989)
and the adjustment costs on prices. The former costs are minimized when the
nominal interest rate is zero and the latter costs are minimized when inﬂation is
at its target level. Under a long-run nominal interest rate target of 0.3 percent
the adjustment costs for prices are centered at a value that is very close to the
Friedman rule rate of deﬂation. Taylor rule 1 follows the Friedman Rule for the
longest period of time and it is thus not surprising that it produces the highest
welfare.
12The welfare measure we use is calculated as follows. First, we compute an equilibrium
allocation for each rule. Let {ct(i),h t(i)} be a sequence of consumption and hours in the
equilibrium under Taylor rule i. And second, we compute for each Taylor rule i aw e l f a r e
measure d(i)d e ﬁn e da sar e a ln u m b e rw h i c hs a t i s ﬁes
P∞
t=0 βt{logct(i)+ν log(1 − ht(i))}
=
P∞
t=0 βt{log(1 + d(i))ct(3) + ν log(1 − ht(3))}
=l o g ( 1 + d(i))/(1 − β)+
P∞
t=0 βt{logct(3) + ν log(1 − ht(3))}.
We approximate the inﬁnite sum of period utility by a ﬁnite sum from t =0t oT.I nT a b l e
2, the d(i)’s are reported in terms of percentages.
22Other variations in monetary policy
Next we consider three other monetary policies that have been proposed in the
literature. Goodfriend (2000) suggests that a carry tax on money is an eﬀective
way to undo the zero nominal interest rate bound. Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) ﬁnd that policy duration is part of an optimal monetary policy in a model
with no capital accumulation. Finally, a higher setting of the long-run nominal
interest rate avoids the zero nominal interest rate bound. Table 3 reports sim-
ulation results for these three cases and the baseline Taylor rule 3 speciﬁcation.
In all cases it is assumed that the output and inﬂation feedback coeﬃcients are
respectively 0.4 and 1.7. “Unconstrained” corresponds to the policy proposed
by Goodfriend (2000).13 “Policy duration” assumes that the nominal interest
rate is kept at zero for ﬁve years beyond the point where the zero constraint
ceases to bind. “Price stability” refers to a scenario where the long-run nominal
interest rate target is 2.3 percent. This value is consistent with a stable long-run
price level.
Observe that the policies labeled unconstrained and price stability have very
similar properties. Growth rates of both real and nominal variables are nearly
the same in all sub-samples. Both policies produce stronger consumption and
output growth in the second half of the 1990s as compared to Taylor rule 3.
However, between 2000 and 2009 the picture is reversed and the Taylor rule 3
speciﬁcation exhibits stronger output and consumption growth. Welfare is also
13Goodfriend (2000) points out that a carry tax on money will undo the zero nominal interest
rate constraint and suggests that taxing reserves is one way that a central bank can implement
such a policy. In our model the easiest way to model this is to tax beginning of period
holdings of money. Suppose that the tax on money is τm,t, then it can be shown that setting
τm,t+1 = −Rt when the nominal interest rate is negative undoes the zero bound constraint.
To see this note that with a carry tax (A3) is replaced with ctΥ0(Mt+1/Pt)=
Rt+τm,t+1
1+Rt . This
change does not aﬀect any other equilibrium conditions under a Taylor rule so the equilibrium
values of all other variables are not aﬀected.
23nearly identical for the unconstrained and price stability policies. The overall
magnitude of the welfare gains relative to Taylor rule 3 is about the same as the
welfare gains for stabilizing business cycle ﬂuctuations that Lucas (2003) has
estimated using U.S. data. He estimates that the beneﬁts of stabilizing business
cycle ﬂuctuations are about 0.05 percent in the U.S.
Policy duration produces higher output and consumption growth during the
1990s than Taylor rule 3. Moreover, policy duration also produces the highest
welfare of the four policies. Only Taylor rule 1 in Table 2 produces higher
welfare. The mechanisms underlying this result are neoclassical. Policy duration
is better than the other monetary policies because it is a closer approximation
to the Friedman rule. This result is not unique to Taylor rule 3. When policy
policy duration experiments are performed for the other Taylor rules extending
the period of time that the nominal interest rate is zero also enhances welfare.
Before concluding we wish to say a few words about the robustness of the
welfare results to our modeling assumptions. Some of the welfare rankings
reported in Tables 2 and 3 hinge crucially on the assumption of perfect foresight.
From the impulse response analysis we know that a binding zero nominal interest
rate has signiﬁcant and negative impacts on the response of the economy to
positive innovations in technology and negative shocks to government purchases.
The welfare eﬀects of these shocks can be large. For instance, if we compare
welfare for the two impulse responses to technology reported in Figure 1B using
the same method described above, imposing the zero bound constraint produces
a welfare loss of 0.34 percent. This welfare loss is larger than any of the results
reported in Table 2.14 Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to solve
14The welfare loss associated with imposing the zero interest rate constraint for the govern-
24and compute equilibria for a stochastic version of our model, it is still interesting
to conjecture what such an analysis might ﬁnd. Our impulse response analysis
shows that the arrival of positive TFP shocks in real time can have strong
and negative implications for economic activity and welfare when the nominal
interest rate is zero. This fact suggests that monetary policies such as Taylor
rule 1 and/or policy duration might be very costly in a stochastic environment.
Both of these speciﬁcations imply that the nominal interest rate is zero for many
periods.
One solution to this problem is to undo the zero constraint via a carry tax on
money as proposed by Goodfriend (2002). However, such a policy may be costly
to implement and doesn’t diﬀer much in terms of welfare from the alternative of
simply setting the long-run nominal interest rate at a higher level. Results from
our model suggest that a long-run nominal interest rate target of 2.3 percent is
probably suﬃcient to avoid the bound. This setting of the nominal interest rate
is consistent with price stability and has the property that even extremely large
shocks to government purchases fail to produce a binding zero constraint. In
the case of technology shocks only very large positive shocks with a magnitude
of 16 percent or larger would induce a binding constraint. In this sense setting
the long-run nominal interest rate at a target level of 2.3 percent or higher is a
good robust policy.
ment purchases shock in Figure 1A is much smaller: 0.016 percent.
255 Conclusion
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dt h ee ﬀects of monetary policy in the neighbor-
hood of the zero nominal interest rate in a model with costly price adjustment
and capital accumulation. We found a speciﬁcation that accounts for both the
nominal and real facts from the 1990s in Japan. Two key ingredients are needed
to reproduce the measured decline in the nominal interest rate to zero. House-
holds must expect higher government purchases in future years and the long-run
nominal interest rate target of the monetary authority must be very low. We
also performed some counterfactual experiments to ascertain the extent to which
alternative monetary policies might have improved economic activity during the
1990s and/or avoided the zero nominal interest rate bound.
We ﬁnd that the setting of the long-run inﬂation target is much more impor-
tant for avoiding the zero bound than the short-run reaction of monetary policy
to a particular sequence of exogenous shocks. We consider various settings of
t h eT a y l o rr u l er e a c t i o nc o e ﬃcients on output and inﬂation, and none of them
avoid the zero nominal interest rate bound. We also consider other policies that
have been suggested in the literature. Policies that keep the nominal interest
rate low for long periods of time are good policies under the assumption of per-
fect foresight. Setting the long-run interest rate target in a way to maintain
price stability is also a good policy. We conjecture that this latter ﬁnding would
also apply in a stochastic environment.
In future work we plan to investigate the role of other shocks including
shocks to the ﬁnancial sector and develop computational methods that allow us
to analyze the zero bound in an environment with uncertainty.
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Appendix: solution method
In this appendix we describe our solution method more precisely. As in the
literature, we ﬁrst derive the equilibrium conditions and detrend variables so
27that all variables in the system are stationary. The equilibrium conditions are
1=β(ct/ct+1)(1 + Rt)/(1 + πt), (A1)
wt = νct/(1 − ht), (A2)























































Tt + gt = τ(rt − δ)kt +( Mt+1 − Mt)/Pt

















and monetary policy. Note that we use symmetricity among intermediate ﬁrms
to derive the above expressions.
As stated in the body, in our analysis we limit attention to equilibria in
which the zero nominal interest rate constraint binds once for a ﬁnite number of
periods so that IB = {S,S +1,S+2,...,T −2,T−1}. Because we have already
d e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3 . 1h o wt oc o m p u t eS, T and ˆ kT, suppose in the following
we know them.
28Log-linearization
We linearize the system around the steady-state. All variables are log-linearized
except r, R and π which are linearized without taking logarithms.
0=ˆ ct − ˆ ct+1 +( 1 /(1 + R)) ˆ Rt − (1/(1 + π))ˆ πt+1 (A12)
ˆ wt =ˆ ct +( h/(1 − h))ˆ ht (A13)
ˆ rt/r = ˆ ht +ˆ wt − ˆ kt (A14)
ˆ yt = αˆ kt +( 1− α)ˆ ht +( 1− α) ˆ At (A15)
ˆ rt/r =ˆ χt − (1 − α)ˆ kt +( 1− α)ˆ ht +( 1− α) ˆ At (A16)
˜ yˆ yt =˜ cˆ ct +˜ gˆ gt +˜ xˆ xt (A17)
(eµ − 1+δ)ˆ xt = eµˆ kt+1 − (1 − δ)ˆ kt (A18)
0=θχˆ χt − (γ/(1 + π))ˆ πt +( βγ/(1 + π))ˆ πt+1 (A19)
ˆ ct =ˆ ct+1 − βφeµˆ kt+2 +( 1+β)φeµˆ kt+1
−φeµˆ kt − βe−µ(1 − τ)ˆ rt+1 (A20)





−R if S ≤ t ≤ T − 1
ρyˆ yt + ρπˆ πt if t ≤ S − 1o rT ≤ t.
(A21)
State Space Representation
We can summarize the equations (A12)-(A20) by three equations eliminating
endogenous variables other than R, π, y and k. These three equations and the
29identity ˆ kt+1 = ˆ kt+1 can be written using matrices and vectors as:
D1zt+1 = D2zt + d3 ˆ Rt + D4 t (A22)
where zt =( ˆ πt, ˆ yt,ˆ kt+1,ˆ kt)0,  t =( ˆ gt+1,ˆ gt, ˆ At+1, ˆ At)0, Di’s are appropriately
deﬁned 4 × 4c o e ﬃcients matrices and d3 is 4 × 1c o e ﬃcients vector.








zt + D4 t if t ≤ S − 1o rT ≤ t
D2zt − d3R + D4 t if S ≤ t ≤ T − 1
(A23)
Case 1: t ≥ T










= F1zt + G t (A24)
Under our parameterization we can diagonalize F1 as V1Λ1V
−1
1 .T h e r e b yt h e
equation (A24) is rewritten as
qt+1 = Λ1qt + V
−1
1 G t (A25)
where qt = V
−1
1 zt.S i n c eΛ1 is diagonal, we have
qt+1(i)=λ1,iqt(i)+( V
−1
1 G)i t (A26)
30for i =1 ,2,3,4w h e r eqt(i)i st h ei-th element of qt, λ1,i is the i-th diagonal
element of Λ1 and (V
−1
1 G)i is the i-th row of V
−1
1 G. The stability condition
of this system is that Λ1 has only one stable root. If this condition is satisﬁed,
we can solve the system of qt(i)’s for t ≥ T in the following manner. Let λ1,4
be the stable root, then for i =1 ,2,3,







1 G)i t+j, (A27)
and for i =4 ,
qt+1(4) = λ1,4qt(4) + (V
−1
1 G)4 t. (A28)
Since our model is perfect foresight and we specify the entire path of  t,w ec a n
compute qt(i)f o ri =1 ,2,3a n dt ≥ T from (A27). Because we know ˆ kT,w ec a n
compute qT(4) and zT from the relationship qT = V
−1
1 zT s i n c eh e r ew eh a v e
four equations and four unknowns (ˆ πT, ˆ yT,ˆ kT+1,q T(4)). Finally, by iterating
forward, we can obtain the whole sequence of qt(4) and zt for t ≥ T.
Case 2: S ≤ t ≤ T − 1
For all t such that S ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
zt+1 = D
−1
1 D2zt − D
−1
1 d3R + D
−1
1 D4 t
= F2zt − D
−1
1 d3R + G t
31Under our parameterization F2 is invertible. Thus from zT, we can obtain the

































1 d3R − G S
´
.
Case 3: t ≤ S
For all t such that t ≤ S, we again have
zt+1 = F1zt + G t.
Under our parameterization F1 is invertible. Therefore, we can calculate the se-
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 Table 3* 
A comparison of alternative monetary policies in the presence of a zero bound 














1990-1994            
  Taylor Rule 3  1.19 1.17  -0.77  -0.59  3.38  0.85 
  Unconstrained  1.23 1.14  -0.53  -0.44  4.07  1.46 
  Policy Duration  1.50 1.31  0.26  -0.00  4.79  1.95 
  Price Stability  1.24 1.15  -0.49  -0.42  6.19  3.51 
1995-1999            
  Taylor Rule 3  -0.06 0.23  -0.55  -1.72  0.22  -1.80 
  Unconstrained  0.52 0.70  0.87  -0.98  1.50  -0.92 
  Policy Duration  0.17 0.54  -0.33  -1.68  1.40  -0.72 
  Price Stability  0.52 0.70  0.87  -0.98  3.57  1.10 
2000-2004            
  Taylor Rule 3  0.85 0.10  0.21  0.57  0.00  -2.12 
  Unconstrained  0.50 -0.06  -0.92  -0.10  -0.25  -2.05 
  Policy Duration  0.69 -0.01  -0.21  0.34  0.00  -1.97 
  Price Stability  0.51 -0.06  -0.92  -0.10  1.79  -0.05 
2005-2009            
  Taylor Rule 3  0.65 0.05  -0.57  0.52  0.00  -2.05 
  Unconstrained  0.48 -0.12  -0.90  0.37  -0.42  -2.33 
  Policy Duration  0.65 0.03  -0.52  0.57  0.00  -2.02 
  Price Stability  0.48 -0.11  -0.90  0.37  1.62  -0.33 
1990-2009            
  Taylor Rule 3  0.66 0.39  -0.42  -0.31  0.90  -1.28 
  Unconstrained  0.68 0.42  -0.37  -0.29  1.23  -0.96 
  Policy Duration  0.75 0.47  -0.20  -0.19  1.55  -0.69 
  Price Stability  0.69 0.42  -0.36  -0.28  3.29  1.06 
*  Output, consumption, investment, and hours are expressed as average annual 
percentages and nominal interest rate and inflation are average levels over the indicated 
interval. Welfare is measured as the constant amount of consumption that  
renders welfare in the constrained case equal to welfare in the unconstrained case. 
Welfare for the unconstrained, policy duration and price stability simulations is 
respectively, 0.066%, 0.11% and 0.063%.    
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